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1 Introduction
Looking at the historical experiences of specific countries it seems uncontroversial that an
abundance of natural resources can shape political outcomes. Few observers of Venezuela,
Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and many other resource-rich countries would take seriously the propo-
sition that political developments in these countries can be understood without reference –
indeed without attributing a central role – to these countries’ natural wealth. Yet, the mecha-
nisms through which natural-resource abundance affects politics frustrate attempts to identify
simple generalizations, with resource-rich countries displaying great variations in measures
of autocracy and democracy, and political stability. For example, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria
both feature a strong tendency towards autocracy but the former is extraordinarily stable while
the latter has experienced nine successful coups since independence (and many unsuccessful
ones). Venezuela seems to go back and forth between democracy and autocracy, with swings
that closely follow the price of oil, while of course Norway appears to be safely and stably
democratic irrespective of the oil price.
In this paper we use a large panel of countries and within-country variation to document
the following regularities. Natural resource windfalls have no effect on the political system
when they occur in democracies. However, windfalls have significant political consequences
in autocracies. In particular, when an autocratic country receives a positive shock to its flow
of resource rents it responds by becoming even more autocratic. Importantly, there is hetero-
geneity in the response of autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies the effect of windfalls
on politics is virtually nil. It is only in moderately entrenched autocracies that windfalls ex-
acerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. Hence, our evidence generalizes casual
observation: windfalls have little or no impact in democracies (the Norways) or very stable
autocracies (Saudi Arabia), but change the political equilibrium in more unstable autocracies
(Nigeria, Venezuela).
To reach these conclusions we measure natural-resource windfalls as changes in the price of
a country’s principal export commodity. We argue that such changes are plausibly exogenous
to changes in a country’s political system. First, the identity of a country’s main export com-
modity (e.g. oil v. gold) should be mostly driven by geography and geology. Second, the vast
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majority of countries individually account for a relatively small share of world output in their
principal export commodity, so it is unlikely that political changes there will have an important
effect on prices.1 Also, since we include country fixed effects, our results cannot be driven
by underlying country-specific trends common to changes in principal-commodity prices and
changes in political regimes.
Our main measure of political institutions is the variable Polity2 from the Polity IV database.
Crucially for our analysis this is a continuous measure that varies from extreme autocracy
(Polity2= -10) to perfect democracy (Polity2= +10), so it allows us to condition the analysis
on infra-marginal differences in the degree of autocracy/democracy, as well as to capture the
effects of windfalls on infra-marginal changes in autocracy/democracy. As this variable cap-
tures the extent to which the political system is open to competition, we sometimes refer to our
measure of autocracy/democracy as a measure of “political contestability.”
To get a better sense of the sort of episodes driving our empirical analysis consider the
recent case of oil-rich Kazakhstan. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been in office since the
country became independent. He has gradually expanded his presidential powers by decree:
only he can initiate constitutional amendments, appoint and dismiss the government, dissolve
Parliament, call referendums, and appoint administrative heads of regions and cities. This
expansion in his powers has coincided with strong rise in the international price of oil. In 2002
the president promulgated a law that set very stringent requirements for the maintenance of
legal status of a political party. As a consequence, the number of legal parties dropped from
19 in 2002 to 8 in 2003. In the same year the president imprisoned two leaders of the main
opposition party on charges of corruption. As a result of these changes Kazakhstan’s Polity2
score dropped from -4 to -6 in 2002. In the three preceding years the average annual increase
in the price of oil had been 27%, leading to a doubling of the price over the period. Another
oil-related case that will be fresh in the memory of many readers is Iran in 2009. With the price
of oil increasing on average by 22% per year during the previous three years, the presidential
elections of that year were considered fraudulent by the opposition, who rejected the results and
called for mass demonstrations. These demonstrations were violently repressed by the regime.
1In the empirical analysis we address the issue of large producers with the potential to influence world prices,
and find that our results are not affected by these economies.
3
As a result, Iran’s Polity2 score fell from -6 to -7.
Such examples are certainly not limited to oil. In El Salvador the presidential elections of
February 1977 took place with the price of coffee increasing by an average 41% per year in
the previous three years. There was a clumsy and poorly disguised electoral fraud in favour
of the ruling conservative party candidate, General Carlos Humberto Romero. The opposi-
tion candidate, Colonel Ernesto Claramount, and a crowd of thousands gathered in the Plaza
Libertad in San Salvador to protest Romero’s election. The rally was attacked by government
forces, leaving as many as fifty protesters dead. In November the grip of repression was fur-
ther strengthened with the approval of the Law for the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order,
eliminating almost all legal restrictions on violence against civilians. As a result El Salvador’s
Polity2 score fell from -1 to -6.2
In order to motivate our empirical analysis, and facilitate the interpretation of the results, we
open the paper with a simple model of endogenous determination of political contestability. In
our model there is a governing elite that has complete control of the flow of income from natural
resources, and decides whether and how much of it to invest in what we call “self-preservation
activities”. These range from the mild (e.g. direct or indirect vote-buying) to the extreme
(violent repression of the opposition). At the same time, a political entrepreneur outside the
ruling elite decides whether or not to challenge those in power and try to replace them. This
simple game generates endogenously two possible political “modes”: free and fair political
competition (recognizable as democracy), where the elite essentially allows challenges to occur
on a relatively level-playing field, and the political entrepreneur chooses to compete for power;
and a “repression” mode where the elite invests some of the resources deriving from natural
resources in self-preservation activities, without however succeeding in completely deterring
challenges.
The key determinant of the regime that is selected as an equilibrium is the amount of revenue
2A very similar case is represented by Guatemala, whose principal commodity is also coffee. As in El Salvador,
also in Guatemala the role of the military had been prominent since the early 1960s, with the support of the
coffee elite. The response to social protests during the 1970’s were similar to those in El Salvador. The
Presidential elections of 1978 took place with prices of coffee increasing on average by 60% per year in the
previous three years. The elections were fraudulent, and the ensuing revolutionary movement was repressed
by the harsh counter-revolutionary activity of the government, backed by the military and the coffee oligarchy.
This started a period of violence and institutional chaos that only ended in 1985 with the return to democracy.
Guatemala’s Polity2 score fell from -3 to -5 in 1978.
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accruing to the government from natural resources. This enters the ruling elite’s decision prob-
lem in two ways: it is part of the payoff from staying in office, as political survival implies that
the current elite remains in control of future revenues; and it also enters the budget constraint,
as it is the principal source of funding for self-preservation activities, such as vote-buying or po-
litical repression. At low levels of resource income, the incentive to engage in self-preservation
spending is relatively low, as the future “pie” to hold on to is small. Democracy is the out-
come. At higher levels the future benefits from holding on to power are sufficiently large that
the government shifts to autocracy. Crucially, the larger the pie, the more the incumbent finds
it optimal to spend on self-preservation, so the degree of autocracy is increasing in the size of
the resource rents.
One prediction of the model is that political contestability is non-linearly related to resource
abundance. Ceteris paribus, resource-poor countries will be democratic, while resource-rich
ones will be autocratic, and the level of autocracy will be increasing in the amount of resource
rents. However, for reasons we discuss later, this prediction is hard to test in an econometrically
compelling way. We therefore note that another prediction of the model is that resource-poor
countries (which the model predicts to be democracies) will not experience changes in polit-
ical contestability following (small) resource shocks, while resource-abundant countries will.
Furthermore, in the model, the rate of decline in political contestability following changes in
resource rents is decreasing in the initial level of resource rents (and hence in the initial level
of autocracy). This is due to an assumption of decreasing returns in self-preservation spending
by the incumbent government. Hence, the model also predicts that in autocracies the effect
of windfalls is decreasing in the extent to which the autocracy is entrenched. This predicted
heterogeneity in response between democracies and autocracies, as well as within autocracies,
is the focus of our empirical work.
The threshold levels of resource income that cause the shift from one political regime to the
other depend on parameters that may vary across countries. For example if the “ego rents”
from office are lower, the range of values of natural wealth for which the ruling elite accepts
free and fair challenges is (potentially much) wider than in places where political power per se
offers greater rewards. A similar effect is produced if the “technology” for self-preservation is
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less effective, which could be the case in countries with a culture less deferential to those in
power, where the citizens are willing to bear greater costs to challenge abuses, or where political
leaders cannot rely on pre-existing structures of power (e.g. ethnic allegiances) to lever the
resources conferred by incumbency. In this way, the model can potentially also explain cases,
such as Norway, where great natural-resource wealth is associated with democracy.
The paper continues as follows. In the next subsection we briefly review the relevant litera-
ture. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 presents data and results. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
An important literature in political science studies the relationship between resource abun-
dance and democratic/autocratic institutions using predominantly comparative case studies or
cross-country variation (Ross, 2001a,b, 2009; Ulfelder, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Alex-
eev and Conrad, 2009; Tsui, 2011).3 While there is some heterogeneity in the conclusions this
literature tends to reach, the evidence in these studies points to a negative relationship between
resource abundance and democracy/democratization, consistent both with our model and the
circumstantial cross-sectional evidence we also present below. However, we argue that identifi-
cation of causal effects can be achieved with greater confidence using within-country variation,
and this is the basis for the core of our empirical evidence.
A recent literature, narrowly focused on windfalls from oil, uses within-country evidence.
Haber and Menaldo (2011) and Wacziarg (2012) find no evidence that oil windfalls lead to
greater autocracy. One concern with the Haber and Menaldo (2011) study is that its measure
of oil revenue, partly based on oil production, is potentially endogenous to democratic change,
while a possible concern with Wacziarg’s analysis is that it uses the world oil price for all
countries, meaning that there is no possibility to include time effects to control for global
trends. Brückner et al. (2012) find a positive coefficient on oil-price shocks interacted with the
share of net oil exports in GDP in a regression for movements towards democracy. They do not
condition on whether the country is initially a democracy or an autocracy, nor do they examine
3Tsui (2011) is perhaps closest to us among these, as he also looks at the heterogenous responses between
democracies and autocracies. His results are consistent with ours. Aside from relying on cross-sectional
evidence, however, his contribution only focuses on oil, and does not explore heterogeneity in responses
within autocracies.
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heterogeneous responses within autocracies.4
More broadly the paper contributes to a significant empirical literature on the economic de-
terminants of democracy/autocracy. Many authors have investigated the causal relationship
between income and democracy (e.g. Barro, 1999; Epstein et al., 2006; Ulfelder and Lustik,
2007; Glaeser et al., 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2008; Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Burke and
Leigh, 2010). As discussed, we focus not on generic income changes but more specifically on
windfalls associated with commodity price shocks. Because natural-resource booms typically
translate into direct windfalls into the hands of political elites these shocks may have very dif-
ferent political consequences than other sources of income shocks. In fact, the literature on the
natural resource curse casts doubt on the premise that resource windfalls reach the general pop-
ulation (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 2001; Caselli and Michaels, 2013). Burke and Leigh (2010)
do use commodity price changes as instruments for income changes, so their work is more
closely related. They find insignificant effects of commodity-driven income changes on polit-
ical regimes. Their focus, however, is on dichotomous variables measuring the onset of large
changes towards autocracy or democracy. Instead, in keeping with the spirit of our model, we
study changes in autocracy/democracy as a continuous variable. Furthermore, Burke and Leigh
(2010) do not condition the effect of commodity price changes on whether the country was ini-
tially democratic or autocratic, much less on infra-marginal differences in the initial level of
political contestability. Finally, as already mentioned, in Burke and Leigh (2010) the effect of
windfalls is mediated by their effect on income changes, while we estimate the direct effect of
the windfall. For the reasons mentioned above there may be reasons to prefer a reduced-form
specification.
Finally, several authors have looked at the effects of resource windfalls on political-economy
outcomes other than democracy/autocracy. For example, Leite and Weidmann (1999), Tavares
(2003), Sala-i Martin and Subramanian (2003), Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) and Caselli and
Michaels (2013) present corresponding empirical evidence on resource abundance and corrup-
tion. Besley and Persson (2011), Lei and Michaels (2014), Cotet and Tsui (2013), Dube and
4A possible interpretation of the result in Brückner et al. (2012) is that, since the oil share is highly correlated with
autocracy, their oil-share/oil-price interaction operates as a rough proxy for our autocracy/oil-price interaction.
The results are therefore consistent with ours, as in both cases they imply a lesser movement towards autocracy
in more entrenched autocracies.
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Vargas (2013), among others, have looked at resource windfalls and civil war/political violence;
Deaton and Miller (1995) and Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) at incumbents’ survival; Egorov
et al. (2009) at media repression by autocrats; and Caselli et al. (2013) at international war.
Theoretically, our model is illustrative of a class of contributions that have examined the
effect of resource windfalls on rulers/elites’ decisions on the amount of political contenstabil-
ity they choose to allow (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2004; Caselli, 2006; Dunning, 2008; Caselli
and Cunningham, 2009; Tsui, 2010; Besley and Persson, 2011). Resource windfalls may in-
crease repression by relaxing the ruler’s budget constraint (particularly emphasized by Ace-
moglu et al., 2004);5 in response to increased challenges by outsiders (Tsui (2010)); or because
they increase the value of staying in power for the incumbent (this paper).6 Many of these
studies (particularly those by Caselli (2006) and by Tsui (2010)) derive non-monotonicities
analogous to the one in this paper, and for similar reasons. More generally, the model belongs
to a class of work on “conditional” resource curses, i.e. where the effects of resource wind-
falls can be beneficial or adverse according to the size of the windfall or the values of certain
conditioning variables (e.g. Tornell and Lane, 1998; Baland and Francois, 2000; Torvik, 2002;
Cabrales and Hauk, 2011; Besley and Persson, 2011; Caselli and Coleman, 2013).
2 Natural Resources and Political Outcomes
2.1 Model
The setting is a discrete-time infinite-horizon economy which generates, in every period, a
constant flow of consumption goods A from the exploitation of natural resources. Interpreta-
tions of A include: the flow of royalties and other fees paid to the government by international
extracting companies for the right to operate in the country; profits of state-owned corporations
engaged in drilling and mining; rents generated by the international distribution of domestic
cash crops by state-controlled marketing boards; or other rents linked to cash-crops exports
5Haggard and Kaufman (1997) and Geddes (1999) also stress the role of the budget constraint of political in-
cumbents.
6In Dunning (2008) however, windfalls may reduce suppression of contestability as they reduce the amount of
redistribution that would be implemented under democracy.
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due to discrepancies between official and market exchange rates. We will refer to A as “re-
source rents.”7
The economy is populated by an infinite number of infinitely-lived agents (which can also
be intepreted as political dynasties or interest groups). In every period there is one agent that
begins the period as the “incumbent.” One should think of the incumbent as the individual, or
group of individuals, who has de facto control of the government. In a democracy this would be
the President and his collaborators (in presidential systems), or the leadership of the governing
parties (in parliamentary systems). In autocracies this would be the autocrat, his family, and
his close associates.
The sequence of events and actions within each period is the following. First the incumbent
allocates the period rents A between self-preservation spending, Bt and consumption, Ct . Next,
nature picks at random another agent (not the incumbent) to be the “potential challenger.” The
potential challenger then decides whether or not to stage a challenge to the incumbent. If
yes, the challenge succeeds with probability p(Bt). If the challenge succeeds, the challenger
begins the next period as the new incumbent. If the challenge fails, the incumbent begins the
next period as incumbent. If the potential challenger does not challenge, the incumbent also
continues as incumbent. Time is discounted by all agents at rate β .
In a democracy the potential challenger could be interpreted as the person with the best
chance to win an electoral context against the incumbent president/party. In an autocracy it
could be the agent best placed to successfully lead a coup or a popular uprising against the
ruling clique. The assumption that in every period there is only one potential challenger is
not important for the results but simplifies the analysis. For simplicity of presentation and
again without loss of generality we also assume that potential challengers are drawn without
replacement (i.e. each agent gets at most one chance to challenge) and that deposed incumbents
never get a chance to challenge subsequent incumbents.
Period payoffs for the incumbent are Ct +Θ. One interpretation of Ct is resources appro-
priated by the incumbent and his clique for personal enrichment - the infamous “Swiss bank
7We abstract from other sources of government revenues, as none of our comparative static results would be
affected by their explicit inclusion. Nor are we able to make progress on the important question of whether/why
resource windfalls have different political effects than other types of government revenues.
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accounts.” But in general Ct could be interpreted as an aggregate of all the spending that pro-
vides satisfaction to the incumbent and hence, possibly, it could include public spending on
schools, hospitals, etc., if the incumbent is partially altruistic or derives satisfaction from doing
a “good job.” An incumbent also receives a flow of “ego rents,” Θ. Assuming that there are
additional benefits (both psychological and material) from holding political power is realistic
and indeed standard in the literature (e.g. Rogoff, 1990; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996).
Period payoffs for the individual selected as the potential challenger are normalized to 0 if he
challenges, and toΠ if he does not challenge. Π represents the present value of income from his
activities outside politics. We also normalize to 0 the continuation payoff of a challenger if he
chooses to challenge and the challenge fails, as well as the continuation payoff of an incumbent
who is successfully challenged.8
The probability that a challenge will succeed is decreasing in self-preservation spending, or
p′(Bt) < 0. Our interpretation of self-preservation spending is as a catch-all for all activities
the government engages in in order to subvert the outcome of the political-selection process in
his favour. Anecdotically, it appears that the “first steps” towards autocracy are relatively mild:
“beginner” autocrats engage in some patronage, some vote buying, some corruption of journal-
ists and media outlets. More established ones add some physical or judicial intimidation, and
perhaps electoral irregularities. Yet more aggressive autocrats further include disappearances
and show trials. Finally, the most entrenched call off elections, prohibit political parties, and
repress violently all sorts of opposition. If this description is correct, then the overall budget
devoted to these activities seems likely to rise, as further tools are deployed by the autocrat. At
the same time the likelihood of a successful challenge declines. This is why we assume that p
is decreasing in B.
Hence, B captures infra-marginal variation in the efforts exerted by those currently in power
to subvert the rules of the game in their favour, with greater values of B being associated with
greater autocracy. By the same token, we think of B = 0 as the situation where the incumbent
accepts to be challenged on a “free and fair” basis. In sum, we interpret countries with B= 0 as
“democracy” and countries with B > 0 as displaying varying levels of autocracy. Since B also
8These normalizations could be relaxed as long as both the incumbent and the challenger prefer winning rather
than losing in case of a challenge.
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affects a potential challenger’s chances of taking over we will also refer to B as a measure of
political contestability. In order to obtain crisp results, we need to pick a functional form for
p(B). We use
p(B) =Ωe−δB,
where Ω ∈ (0,1) and δ > 0 are exogenous parameters. Hence, self-preservation spending is
subject to decreasing returns, with p(0) = Ω - implying that a challenger can never be ab-
solutely certain of success - and p(B) > 0 for all B - implying that an autocrat can never be
absolutely sure of successfully withstanding a challenge. These features are important but
seem sensible.
The most restrictive assumption of the model is that the components of Ct do not affect p
or Π. If the public is less tolerant of corrupt politicians, then we might expect the components
of Ct that represent self-enrichment to enter p positively. If the public rewards competent
politicians, we should expect the components of Ct that represent public spending to enter
p negatively, in the tradition of Barro (1973). In addition, public spending in infrastructure,
human capital, and other growth-promoting public goods could improve the outside option of
potential challengers by improving opportunities in the private economy (or increasing the cost
of recruiting supporters). Hence, these components of Ct could increase Π. We abstract from
these issues in order to get simple results, but see Caselli and Cunningham (2009) and Tsui
(2010) for a detailed discussion.9
2.2 Analysis
We formally analyze the model in the Web Appendix. Here we offer a heuristic discussion
and explain the key results.
9A straightforward extension in the direction of allowing productive public spending would be as follows. Rents
are allocated between repression, B, private consumption, C, and productive public spending, G, and the
probability of successful challenge is decreasing in both B and G: p(B) =Ωe−δB−γG. It is immediate to show
that in this case the incumbent never uses both tools at the same time. In particular, if δ > γ the incumbent
only uses repression, while if δ < γ he only uses productive public spending. Hence, one interpretation of the
model is that we focus on the case δ > γ . Another interpretation is that the relative magnitudes of γ and δ
vary across countries, perhaps for cultural, geographic, or geostrategic reasons. In countries where δ > γ the
analysis in the rest of this section applies. Countries with γ > δ will obviously be democracies, as we defined
democracy as a country with B = 0. Furthermore, in such countries shocks to natural-resource rents will have
no impact on B. Hence, we recover the same empirical prediction as in the baseline model, namely that we
should observe no systematic response of political institutions to resource shocks in democracies.
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We focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), of which we show there is only one. Given
that the only state variable is the resource rent A, and this is constant over time, it is immediate
that players will follow stationary strategies, namely the incumbent will set the same value of B
in every period, while the potential challenger will either always challenge or never challenge.
We begin by establishing the conditions for equilibria where the challenger always chal-
lenges. In such an equilibrium, the value of being an incumbent at the beginning of any period
is
V (A,B′) =
Θ+A−B′
1−β [1− p(B′)] ,
where B′ is the equilibrium level of self-preservation spending. In every period the incumbent
receives ego rents Θ and consumes resource rents net of self-preservation spending A−B. This
flow utility is appropriately discounted by taking into account time preferences β , and the fact
that in each period the probability of “political death” is p(B′).
One condition for an equilibrium with challenges is that the level of self-preservation spend-
ing must be feasibly optimal from the point of view of the current incumbent. The current
incumbent’s problem is
max
B
{
Θ+A−B+β [1− p(B)]V (A,B′)}
s.t. B ≥ 0
B ≤ A
In choosing B the incumbent trades off the short-term decline in consumption, with the im-
proved probability of surviving until next period and enjoying the continuation value of office.
The feasibility constraints say that self-preservation spending cannot be negative and cannot
exceed the resources available to the incumbent.10
Now define b(A,B′) as the solution to the above problem. In an equilibrium, b(A,B′) must
10The mechanism highlighted in the model will continue to work even if the government can tap into foreign
financial markets to finance self-preservation spending. Foreign borrowing may somewhat reduce the oppor-
tunity cost of preservation spending by shifting it to the future, creating a bias towards greater autocracy. On
the other hand, autocrats (as most countries) are likely to face increasing, and indeed convex, supply curves
for foreign funds, so the marginal opportunity cost of self-preservation spending will also be increasing and
convex. The combination of an increasing and convex marginal opportunity cost of funds with decreasing
returns in the self-preservation activity will generate the same concave relation (beyond A0) between resource
endowments and self-preservation spending as in the model with a balanced-budget.
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be a fixed point, or
b(A,B′) = B′.
In the Web Appendix we show that this fixed-point problem has a unique solution. In particular,
there exists a value of A, A0 (to be characterized shortly), such that the solution is at the corner
B′= 0 for A≤A0, while for A>A0 B′ is the interior solution to the problem above. We call this
interior solution B∗(A). B∗(A) is increasing, concave, and satisfies B∗(A0) = 0. The intuition
for this result is simple, and can be illustrated with reference to the incumbent’s problem above.
The marginal cost of extra preservation spending is constant and equal to 1. The marginal return
is−p′(B)βV (A,B′), i.e. the improvement in survival probabilities times the value of surviving.
Since the value of surviving is increasing in A, there can be sufficiently low values of A such
that the incumbent renounces all self-preservation efforts. On the other hand, if A is sufficiently
large, the incumbent spends (increasing) amounts on self-preservation. The equilibrium amount
of self-preservation is the one that equalizes marginal cost and marginal benefit.11
The threshold value A0 is given by
A0 =
1−β (1−Ω)−βΩδΘ
βΩδ
,
and is therefore decreasing in the “ego rents” from holding office. Intuitively, the larger the ego
rents, the lower the level of resource rents required to make the incumbent feel that incumbency
is valuable enough to invest resources in protecting it. The technology of political replacement
also affects A0. In particular, a higher productivity of self-preservation spending, δ , makes the
incumbent more willing to exert efforts in this direction, lowering the threshold for autocratic
behavior.
As mentioned above we think of B = 0 as akin to the idea of “free and fair” political com-
petition, and hence as democracy. Since democracy is the observed equilibrium outcome in
many countries, we assume that there exists a region of the parameter space where it occurs.
Formally,
11We show in the Web Appendix that the other constraint, B≤ A, is never binding.
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Parametric Assumption 1 (PA1):
A0 > 0.
A second condition for an equilibrium where the challenger challenges is that challenging is
optimal given the level of self-preservation efforts exerted by the incumbent. If the equilibrium
incumbent strategy is B, the challenger decides to challenge if
p(B)βV (A,B)>Π. (2.1)
The left hand side is the expected utility of challenging. This is equal to the time-discounted
value of beginning next period as the incumbent, times the probability that the challenge will
succeed. The right hand side is the (certain) utility from not challenging, i.e. the outside option
Π.12
Since the value of holding office is increasing in A, condition (2.1) is satisfied for any A if
it is satisfied for A = 0. In turn, the condition is satisfied for A = 0 if the following parametric
assumption holds.13
Parametric Assumption 2 (PA2)
Π<
βΩΘ
1−β (1−Ω) .
Note that for A = 0 the incumbent chooses democracy. If PA2 did not hold incumbents would
face no challenges in democracies. This would be counterfactual so PA2 seems like a plausible
assumption. The simple interpretation of PA2 is that the ego rents from office are sufficiently
attractive relative to private life to make potential challengers willing to try their luck at politics
(when there are no resource rents and the country is a democracy).
A final requirement for an equilibrium where the challenger challenges is that the incumbent
does not try to completely deter a challenge in the current period. The deviation that does so
12Note that Π depends on β . In particular, if pi is the flow utility in the private sector then Π= pi/(1−β ).
13To see that PA1 and PA2 are mutually consistent notice that PA1 can be rewritten as
βΩΘ
1−β (1−Ω) <
1
δ
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is the one that satisfies (2.1) with equality.14 Call B˜c(A) such a deviation. We show that there
exists a level of A, A˜, such that B˜c(A)> A for all A < A˜. This says that “resource poor” incum-
bents cannot afford the level of preservation spending that would be required to completely
deter challenges. Only when A is sufficiently large can an incumbent entirely deter challenges.
The value of A˜ is given by
A˜ =
1
δ
log
βΩΘ
Π(1−β ) .
This is increasing in the ego rents. Larger ego rents mean that potential challengers are less
easily deterred, i.e. the required investments in self-preservation are larger, and therefore unaf-
fordable for a broader range of values of A. Similarly, A˜ is decreasing in the opportunity cost
of challenging and in the productivity of spending.
For values of A≥ A˜ deviating to a strategy of complete deterrence is feasible, and the question
is whether the deviation is preferred. It turns out that this depends on whether log(δΠ)+1≥ 0
– in which case the deviation is preferred – or log(δΠ)+ 1 < 0, in which case the incumbent
sticks to the “interior” (non-deterring) amount of preservation spending. The intuition is that
both δ and Π reduce the cost of full deterrence, the former by increasing the productivity of
preservation spending, and the latter by making the challenger more easily convinced thanks to
a better outside option.
We assume that even when a deviation is feasible the incumbent will not deviate from the
“interior” strategy.15 Formally,
Parametric Assumption 3 (PA3):
log(δΠ)+1 < 0.
This leads to the following summary of the discussion so far.
Lemma 1. Under PA2 and PA3 a MPE where the challenger challenges exists for all A. If
A≤ A0 then B = 0 (democracy). If A > A0 then B = B∗(A) (autocracy).
14We implicitly assume that the incumbent does not challenge when indifferent.
15If we were to replace PA3 with its opposite , and assumed A0 ≤ A˜ then we would have three types of political
regimes: democracies (B= 0 for A≤ A0); unstable autocracies (B= B∗ for A0 < A≤ A˜); and stable autocracies
(B = B˜ for A˜ < A), defined as autocracies that choose to completely deter any challenge. The empirical
predictions would be quite similar.
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We can now turn to the conditions for a MPE where the challenger is deterred. In this
equilibrium the incumbent invests an amount B˜(A) that solves
p(B˜)βV˜ (A, B˜) =Π,
where V˜ (A, B˜) is now the value of incumbency when the challenger does not challenge. B˜(A)
is increasing and concave. By definition of B˜(A) the challenger is deterred. Not surprisingly
it turns out that the policy is feasible if A ≥ A˜, but it is preferred by the current incumbent to
a one-period deviation to the optimal “interior” level of B if PA3 holds. Hence, we have the
following result.
Lemma 2. Under PA3 there is no MPE where the challenger is deterred.
Note that Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the MPE is unique. This gives rise to the following
conclusion.
Conclusion. In the unique MPE equilibrium, resource poor countries are democracies,
while resource rich countries are autocracies. In autocracies, spending on self-preservation is
an increasing and concave function of the resource rents.
This result says that for values of the resource rent that are sufficiently small the value of
staying in office is limited, and does not justify spending on self-preservation. Hence, resource
poor countries will tend to be democratic. For higher values of resource rents the incumbent
finds it optimal to exert efforts to remain in power, and does so up the point where the extra
improvement in the expected value of staying in office is equal to the marginal cost of resources
spent on self-preservation. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium amount of self-preservation spend-
ing as a function of A.
Note that the threshold A0 depends on parameters that are potentially country-varying. For
example, a decline in the effectiveness of self-preservation spending δ or in the ego rents Θ
shifts the autocracy threshold A0 to the right. In other words, countries with greater cultural,
geographical, historical, or external resistance to autocracy – all features that should map into
a lower value of δ – or countries where the same factors dictate that the balance between the
privileges and the responsibilities of political power weighs the latter more (lowΘ), will remain
in democratic mode for a wider range of values of A. This way, the model can perhaps be seen
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as consistent with cases of high A associated with free and fair democracy, such as Norway.16
2.3 Testable Implications
To get us closer to our empirics we now consider the following thought experiment. Suppose
that at some date the value of A unexpectedly increases by a (small) amount dA, and all agents
expect it to remain constant at this value for the indefinite future (this is all consistent with
rational expectations if A is believed to be a random walk). Then we obviously have
dB = 0 for A≤ A0
dB = B∗′ for A0 < A
Hence, in resource-poor countries marginal increases in resource rents lead to no political
change. However, in countries with non-negligible resource rents, further windfalls induce
an increase in self-preservation spending. In particular for intermediate values of the rent flow
the incumbent becomes keener to stay in office, and hence increases his efforts in this direction.
For even larger initial levels of the resource flow, the incumbent finds that the required amount
of spending needed to deter challengers goes up, and must correspondingly increase it. Because
B∗ is a concave functions of A, the response of self-preservation spending is decreasing in the
resource flow over this range.
Combining the two sets of results on the level of B and the change of B as functions of the
initial level of A, it is also possible to recast the latter set of results as conditioned on the initial
level of democracy/autocracy. In particular, as we have noted, for low levels of A countries tend
to be democratic. This implies that in democracies, marginal changes in the flow of resource
rents have no effect on the political equilibrium. For larger values of the resource rent, countries
are autocracies. Hence, we find that in autocracies, marginal changes in the flow of resource
rents make the political equilibrium more autocratic. Furthermore, the degree of tightening
of the autocratic screws is variable. Clearly the concavity of B∗ with respect to the initial
16The uniqueness of the MPE is of course in part a feature of some of our simplifying assumptions. For example,
if we allowed a former incumbent to enjoy the flow payoff of private citizens, and made the value of being a
private citizen depend on the amount of repression experienced, it is conceivable that we would have multiple
MPEs. In particular, if future governments repress a lot, the value of being a citizen goes down, so current
incumbents want to hold-on more tightly.
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level of A also carries through to the relationship between the change and the initial level of B.
Hence, in autocracies, the increase in autocracy following an increase in resource revenues is
diminishing in the initial level of autocracy. For reasons we discuss below, the core empirical
work in the paper is based on the predictions of this paragraph.
3 Evidence
3.1 General strategy
The main result of the model is a highly non-linear relationship between resource income A
and self-preservation efforts B, as depicted in Figure 1. In principle, there are three possible
approaches to try to identify this relationship empirically. We discuss the three approaches and
explain why only one, which we discuss last, is likely to generate compelling evidence. In
discussing the three approaches we assume we have good measures of A and B. In the next
section we discuss the data in detail.
Given a measure of B the first plan that comes to mind (Plan 1) is to try to get a measure
of A and then use non-linear methods to directly estimate the function in Figure 1 using cross-
country data in levels. There are at least two problems with this approach. First, is the well-
rehearsed vulnerability of cross-country relationships to omitted variable bias. There may be
plenty of hard-to-account-for factors correlated both with the volume of resource rents and
the political system. Second, as discussed at the end of the previous section, the autocracy
threshold A0 is likely to be country specific. Appropriate identification would therefore require
explicitly modelling the dependence of A0 on hard-to-measure country specific factors. The
results would likely be fairly opaque and inconclusive.
Plan 2 investigates the relationship between A and B within countries, or, equivalently, in
differences, conditioning on the initial level of A. Looking at the effects of changes in A on
changes in B eliminates time-invariant confounding country-specific factors that bias inference
in levels. Country fixed effects can be added to control for country-specific trends in democ-
racy/autocracy and time effects can be added to control for global trends. Hence, plan 2 largely
sidesteps the first of the identification issues affecting Plan 1. However, because it conditions
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on the initial level of A, Plan 2 still requires an estimate of country-specific autocracy thresholds
A0, so it is still unsatisfactory.
Plan 3, like plan 2, estimates the relationship in differences, but instead of conditioning
on the initial level of A it conditions on the initial level of B. Our theoretical results say that
countries to the left of the autocracy threshold are democracies, so we can infer that if a country
is a democracy it is to the left of its A0. We therefore expect no effect of changes in A on
changes in B in democracies. We also know from the model that countries to the right of A0 are
autocracies, and the further to the right they are the more autocratic they are. Hence, we can
infer that autocracies are to the right of A0, and the more autocratic they are the further to the
right they are. We therefore expect that the effect of changes in A on changes in B is positive in
autocracies, the less so the more autocratic the initial position. This plan largely sidesteps both
the problem of omitted factors in levels and the country-specificity of the autocracy threshold.
3.2 Data
We construct a measure for B from the variable Polity2 in the Polity IV database (Gurr et al.,
2000). Polity2 is widely used in the empirical political-science literature as a measure of the po-
sition of a country on a continuum autocracy-democracy spectrum (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2008;
Persson and Tabellini, 2006, 2009; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Brückner and Ciccone, 2011).
It aggregates information on several building blocks, including political participation (existence
of institutions through which citizens can express preferences over policies and leaders), con-
straints on the executive, and guarantees of civil liberties both in daily life and in political
participation, as evaluated by Polity IV coders. Polity2 varies continuously from -10 (extreme
autocracy) to +10 (perfect democracy).17 Note, therefore, that Polity2 is an inverse measure
of B. We follow the convention in the vast majority of the literature that interprets negative
values of Polity2 as pertaining to autocracies and positive ones to democracies (e.g. Persson
and Tabellini, 2006, 2009; Brückner and Ciccone, 2011; Jones and Olken, 2009; Epstein et al.,
2006).18
17We adjust Polity2 by assigning missing values to cases of interregnum and anarchy, which are instead coded as
0 in the original data. The Web Appendix investigates the robustness of our results to further adjustments.
18In the Web Appendix we discuss alternative thresholds. There, we also present an exercise that attempts to
identify the location of the “kink” in the relationship between changes in B and our measure of resource
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To map the Polity2 score into a proxy for B we make the following assumption:
Polity2it = α− f (Bit)+ εit , (3.2)
where Bit is our variable of interest, f is a monotonic function with f (0) = 0, α > 0 is a con-
stant, and εit is an i.i.d. error with zero mean. These assumptions imply that when the govern-
ment does not attempt to subvert in its favour the political process (B = 0) the Polity2 measure
tends to be positive and its variation to depend on factors we do not model. Instead, when the
government takes an autocratic stance, the Polity2 variable is decreasing in the aggressiveness
of this stance.
As long as f (B) is not (too) convex, Assumption (3.2) implies that the Polity2 score will
inherit the same properties of B in the model. In particular, for values of the Polity2 score
associated with democracies (Polity2> 0, or B = 0) changes in A have no systematic effect on
changes in Polity2 score. In autocracies (negative Polity2, or positive B) increases in A have
negative but decreasing effects on changes in the Polity2 score.
To measure natural-resource windfalls at the country level we proceed as follows. First, for
each country and for each year that data is available we rank all commodities (in the universe
of agricultural and mineral commodities) by value of exports. We then identify each country’s
principal commodity as the commodity that is ranked first in the largest number of years. The
export data by commodity, country, and year are from the United Nation’s Comtrade data set,
which reports dollar values of exports according to the SITC1 system, for the period 1962 to
2009. Finally, we match each country’s principal commodity with an annual time series of that
commodity’s world price. All commodity prices are extracted from the IMF IFS dataset, with
the exception of Gemstones, Pig Iron and Bauxite, whose price series are obtained from the
United States Geological Survey.
We identify a change in A in country i as a change in the price of country i’s principal com-
modity. As both the identity of a country’s principal commodity and its price in international
markets are largely exogenous to the country’s political outcomes we think this measure allows
for clean identification of the causal effects of resource windfalls (we investigate robustness to
windfalls. The results are very consistent with a location at (or near) Polity2=0.
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dropping the largest producers below).19
We study changes over the period 1962-2009. Our baseline sample consists of 131 countries
with information on both principal-commodity export shares and Polity2 scores. There are 32
distinct principal commodities in this sample. The most frequent are oil, which is the principal
commodity in 30 countries, and coffee (11 countries). Table 1 gives the list of these principal
commodities and their distribution among countries. In the Web Appendix we present some
illustrative graphs of the time series relationship between lagged price changes and changes in
political regime for selected countries.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2. ∆Polity2 is the one-year difference in Polity2,
while ∆Pr is the average growth rate in the price of the principal commodity over a three-year
window (we discuss timing issues below). Country Avg. Share is the average over time of the
value of exports of a country’s principal commodity as a share in GDP. Years Princ. Comm.
indicates the number of years the principal commodity has been the principal export, while
Total Years is the total number of years in which commodity shares are available. Some of the
notable features in the data are the huge variation in the Polity2 score and the secular trend
towards greater democracy. The table also shows that principal commodities are ranked first
in almost all years in which resource shares are available. Finally, the table shows that there is
much variation in the measure of resource windfalls.
A further breakdown of the data, reported in the Web Appendix, reveals that there is very
substantial variation in both the commodity-windfall variable and in the political-change vari-
able in all decades of the sample period. Hence, our results are not driven by individual eras of
particularly volatile commodity prices or political upheaval.
In our model regime change is triggered by changes in resource rents that are perceived to
be permanent. We proxy these changes with changes (over three years) in the commodity spot
price. A natural question is whether changes in the spot price are sufficiently persistent to
justify using them as proxies for long-run changes in resource income. In the Web Appendix,
19It would be desirable to check the robustness of our results to non-export based methods to identify principal
commodities, such as total production or endowments. Unfortunately commodity production and endowment
data are not readily available for a large number of countries. We have made an attempt to identify a principal
commodity using total output data from the UN Industry Commodity Production Statistics (ICPS) but, despite
its name, this data set mainly focuses on manufactured goods and does not include many key commodities,
such as coffee (our second most represented principal commodity), cotton, tea, and tobacco.
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we present a variety of tests of stationarity/nonstationarity of our commodity price series. With
very few exceptions and across three different testing strategies, we cannot reject (reject) the
hypotheses that our commodity price series have unit roots (are stationary).20
3.3 Results
Our main empirical results are presented in Table 3. The dependent variable is the one-year
change in Polity2. Recall that an increase in this variable means that the country becomes
less autocratic (more democratic). In column 1 the explanatory variable is the lagged change
in the price of the principal commodity, averaged over the previous three years. Hence, if
the change in Polity2 is measured between years t− 1 and t, the change in commodity prices
is the average over the years t − 4, t − 3, t − 2, and t − 1. We look at lagged changes in
prices to defuse lingering concerns about reverse causation, as well as to allow for possible
lags in the reaction of political actors to economic events. We take averages of price changes
over three periods to reduce the role of extremely transitory shocks as well as measurement
error in the explanatory variable.21 By construction, however, the rolling windows introduce
serial correlation in the estimates. To account for this, we cluster the standard errors at the
country level in all regressions, allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation in the
error term. Crucially, country and time fixed effects are included here, and in all subsequent
specifications.
Column 1 reports estimates for the average effect of resource windfalls, which is negative but
not statistically significant. Recall that in our theory the average effect is a weighted average of
nil effects in democracies and negative effects in autocracies, and thus depends on the relative
20An alternative strategy to capture changes in expected rents from commodities may be to focus on changes in
futures prices. Unfortunately, historical data on futures prices are relatively hard to come by, perhaps because
these markets are less liquid and established than most economists tend to assume. The most comprehensive
source we were able to identify, for example, only features futures prices for 17 of the 32 principal commodities
in our sample. Furthermore, it turns out that contracts exist only for delivery at future dates only relatively
close to the present. In particular, for no commodity but oil could we find future prices with delivery date
further than one year in the future. Even for oil the time series for contracts with delivery date later than one
year suggest that these markets are very illiquid, inducing us to focus on the one-year contract in this case as
well. Finally, for most commodities the sample period for which data is available is significantly shorter than
for the spot prices. As we show in the Web Appendix, despite the much smaller sample size results using
futures prices are entirely in line with those using sport prices. This result is less remarkable than it may seem
as the correlation between spot and futures prices is very high.
21This is also the approach followed by Brückner and Ciccone (2010), and discussed in Deaton (1999).
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frequency of autocratic and democratic observations. In our sample the number of democra-
cies exceeds the number of autocracies (2570 versus 2305 observations). It is therefore not
surprising that the overall effect is not statistically significant.
In the remaining columns we test our more detailed predictions. Column 2 looks at the
effect of price changes in democracies and autocracies separately. This is accomplished by
separating out the price-change variables into two variables: the first is an interaction between
the price change and a dummy for autocracy (following the literature convention that identifies
autocracies as countries with a negative Polity2 score); the second is an interaction between
price change and a dummy for democracy (non-negative Polity2).22 The democracy dummy
is also included separately in the model. To be consistent with the starting date for the price
shock implied by our lagging choices we measure the initial level of autocracy/democracy with
a four year lag, or in year t − 4. As predicted by the model, price changes in the principal
commodity have a negative impact on the Polity2 score in autocracies, i.e. make autocracies
more autocratic. Instead, they have no significant impact on the Polity2 score in democracies.
A more specific prediction of our model is that in democracies commodity-price changes
will have no impact for any initial level of Polity2, while in autocracies the magnitude of the
effect should be increasing in contestability: small in very aggressive autocracies, and larger as
the autocracy takes milder forms. We test this prediction in Column 3, where we add four-year
lags of Polity2 both by themselves and interacted with the (autocracy/democracy specific) price
change, the latter being the variable of interest.23 The conditioning variable has been entered
with a lag to allow once again for potentially slow responses by political actors. As predicted,
in democracies commodity price changes have no impact at any level of initial Polity2, while
in autocracies the increase in autocracy following a resource windfall is larger the higher the
initial value of Polity2, i.e. the less autocratic the form of government was initially.
The results in Columns 1-3 are based on OLS estimation. Because this is a dynamic panel
model with fixed effects, there arises a natural concern with Nickell bias.24 To address this
22It can be easily checked that this is equivalent to including the price change by itself and then an interaction
between the price change and, say, a democracy dummy. Our specification makes the interpretation of the
coefficients even more straightforward.
23Notice that by interacting the price shock with the four-years lag of Polity2 level, ∆Pra is no longer capturing
the average effect in autocracy, but rather the effect in the average autocracy.
24The Fixed-Effects OLS specification transforms the data in deviations from the group mean, producing a me-
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concern, in Column 4 we show results using system-GMM estimation (Blundell and Bond,
1998).25 The system-GMM results are very close to the original OLS. Tests for first- and
second-order autocorrelation in the coefficients hint at a proper specification. While we con-
tinue to present both OLS and system-GMM results throughout the paper, our discussion em-
phasizes the OLS coefficients.26
Our main results are illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the estimated effect of a change
in the price of the principal commodity on the change in Polity2, conditional on the initial
level of Polity2, together with 90% confidence bands. In the top panel, we have the average
(unconditional) effect, which is negative but insignificant. In the middle panel we have average
effects in democracies and autocracies separately. The effect is negative in autocracies and
nil in democracies. In the bottom panel we plot the response conditional on infra-marginal
differences in contestability. The increase in autocracies is more severe the milder the initial
level of autocracy.
The estimated coefficients imply that the impact of resource windfalls for a weak autocracy
(say, at Polity2 level -2) is more than twice as large as the one for a more consolidated autocracy
at Polity2 level -6. In the weak autocracy, the long-run effect of resource windfalls implies that a
10% increase in the price of the principal commodity reduces the Polity2 score by 1.65 points,
or 8% of the domain of Polity2 (which goes from -10 to +10). For the more consolidated
autocracy, instead, the effect of a 10% increase in the price of the principal commodity only
reduces the Polity2 score by 0.8 points. An alternative way to put this is that a weak autocracy
chanical correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term (Nick-
ell, 1981; Bond, 2002).
25System-GMM provides consistent estimates in dynamic panel data model with fixed effects, by taking first
differences and instrumenting the differenced variables with all their available lags in levels and differences.
Asymptotic results of system-GMM are potentially misleading when T increases, as the instrument count
grows large relative to the sample size, over-fitting the instrumented variables and failing to expunge their
endogenous components. To limit the number of instruments generated in system-GMM we follow Beck
and Levine (2004) and Calderon et al. (2002), by combining instruments through addition into smaller sets.
Collapsing makes the instrument count linear in T, while retaining information as no lags are actually dropped
(Roodman, 2009a).
26As can be seen in the subsequent tables system-GMM and OLS results are typically quite close to each other.
This is not surprising given that the large time dimension of our sample (T=48) greatly reduces concerns with
Nickell bias in the OLS specification. Indeed, given the structure of our panel OLS may well be preferable. As
pointed out in Roodman (2009b), “if T is large, dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant, and a more straight-
forward fixed-effects estimator works. Meanwhile, the number of instruments in difference and system-GMM
tends to explode with T. If N is small, the cluster–robust standard errors and the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation
test may be unreliable”.
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like Ecuador (average Polity2 score in autocracy -2) needs a 24% price shock to move to a
more consolidated form of autocracy, like Nigeria’s (average Polity2 score in autocracy -6). For
Nigeria to experience a similar 4 points reduction in the Polity scale, and become like Saudi
Arabia (average Polity2 score in autocracy -10), the price increase in the principal commodity
should be of 50%.
3.4 Robustness checks
In this section we report a number of robustness checks on our results from the previous
subsection. In particular, we discuss robustness to: (i) breaking down the Polity2 score in its
components; (ii) using alternative criteria for inclusion in the sample based on importance of
the principal commodity in the economy; (iii) focusing on observations away from the lower
and upper bounds of Polity2; (iv) dropping large commodity producers with the potential of in-
fluencing the world price; (v) measuring resource-rent shocks based on a basket of commodities
rather than only the principal commodity; (vi) breaking down commodities by type (mineral v.
non-mineral; point-source v. diffuse).27
The Polity2 score is a summary measure of three sets of indicators describing constraints on
the executive, openness and competitiveness of the recruitment process into the executive, and
political competition. All three sets of outcomes are plausible proxies for B. A turn towards a
more autocratic stance will result in fewer constraints on the actions and recruitment process
of the executive power and, by definition, in less political competition. Hence, our first ro-
bustness check is to see whether resource windfalls affect all three subcomponents of Polity2.
The results are reported in Table 4. The results are in line with those obtained on the overall
Polity2 variable: there exists a negative and significant relation, in autocracies only, between
commodity windfalls and the change in all three different components of institutional quality.
The impact among autocracies is heterogeneous and statistically significant at the 95% confi-
dence level for the three Polity2 sub-scores. Given these results, in the rest of the paper we
stick to the overall Polity2 score.
27In the Web Appendix we report further checks based on accuracy of the identification of the principal commod-
ity; alternative ways to treat problematic values of Polity2; alternative timing structures for the relationship
between outcomes and shocks; alternative thresholds for democracy; and alternative measures of the outcome
variable.
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Table 5 checks the robustness of our results to the exclusion of countries whose principal
commodity accounts for only a small share of GDP. For these countries it is unlikely that
a price change represents a large windfall, so focusing on a smaller sample with significant
principal-commodity share is arguably a better test for our model.28 Columns 1 and 2 exclude
countries in the first decile of the average share distribution (14 countries, typically modern
democracies with a diversified economy); columns 3 and 4 exclude countries in the first quar-
tile (33 countries); and columns 5 and 6 exclude all countries below the median average share
(66 countries). Results from baseline sample are confirmed and generally reinforced as we pro-
gressively increase the threshold to be included in the sample. In particular the point estimates
for the average autocracy become more negative as we focus on more commodity dependent
countries. Also the lagged level of Polity2 interacted with the (autocracy specific) price change
remains negative and significant throughout all subsamples, confirming the heterogeneous im-
pact of resource windfalls within autocracies.
A related concern is that the interaction between the level of autocracy and the price of the
principal commodity may proxy for the interaction between the share of the principal com-
modity in the economy and its price. This would be true if countries for which the principal
commodity accounts for a large share of GDP tend to be more autocratic- which is indeed
roughly what our model predicts. If this was true then the coefficient on the interaction term
may simply be saying that large resource-rent shocks leads to increases in autocracy while
small ones do not. To address this concern in the last two columns of Table 5 we add a control
for the share of the principal commodity in GDP. Admittedly econometrically this procedure
is a bit dubious, as the share in GDP of the principal commodity is almost certainly endoge-
nous. Nevertheless, it does serve as a rough-and-ready check on the hypothesis that the Polity
interaction simply proxies for the share of the principal commodity in GDP. As can be seen,
whether estimated by least squares or by system GMM, principal-commodity price increases
reduce democracy, at decreasing rates, in autocracies only, even after controlling for the share
of the principal commodity in GDP. Because of the endogeneity of the principal-commodity
28However this benefit should be weighed against the fact that the size of the commodity sector is endogenous.
Hence this exercise reintroduces through the back door of sample selection the endogeneity issues we sought
to avoid by focusing on price changes. This is why the exercise is a robustness check. Our preferred approach
remains the one in the previous section.
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share, in all other robustness checks we return to the specification that omits this variable.
Table 6 investigates the robustness of our result on the heterogeneous impact of resource
windfalls within autocracies. One potential concern is that such heterogeneity might be driven
by the boundedness of the Polity scale. The argument is that observations at the -10 boundary
are more constrained in their movements than non-boundary observations. In particular, as they
can’t go lower than -10, price increases would not result in institutional changes. We address
this concern in a number of ways. In columns 1 and 2 we restrict the sample to non-negative
Polity2 changes, so that countries at the -10 boundary are unconstrained in their movements.
We still find a negative and significant heterogeneous effect among autocracies. In columns
3 and 4 we perform a similar exercise, but replace the Polity2 change by a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if we observe a positive change and 0 otherwise. This weighs all
institutional changes equally. The heterogeneous impact of price variation is also maintained
under this specification. Columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to all countries that never touched
the [-10, +10] boundaries. This is the sample of countries that had effective free movements
in both positive and negative directions. Also in this case, we find a negative and significant
effect among autocracies. Finally in columns 7 and 8 we exclude all country-year observations
at the [-10, 10] boundaries. Limiting the sample to the unbounded cases provides consistent
estimates for censored regressors (Rigobon and Stoker, 2007, 2009). The results again confirm
the heterogeneity among autocracies.
In a further effort to probe the role of observations at the -10 boundary, we estimate the
heterogenous effect of price changes nonparametrically. We divide all observations into six
bins, depending on the value of Polity2, and re-estimate the relationship between changes in
Polity2 and changes in principal-commodity prices separately for each of these bins (always
including country and year fixed effects). The six bins are for Polity2 values [-10,-8], [-7,-6],
[-5,0], [1,5], [6,7], and [8,10], respectively. These bin sizes were chosen to have as uniform
as possible a sample size across bins, while at the same time preserving symmetry between
“autocratic” and “democratic” bins. The estimated coefficients and the relative confidence
bands (at the 90% level) are plotted against the average value of Polity2 in each bin in Figure
3. The figure shows that even in the second bin from the bottom, the effect of price changes is
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considerably weaker than in the third bin. This is important because for observations in this bin
the lower bound at -10 does not appear ever to be binding. To check this, we have calculated,
for each initial value of the Polity2 variable on the right hand side of our main regression, the
fraction of (strictly) negative policy changes equal to the distance from the lower bound, on
the left hand side. For example, for observations at Polity2=-7, we computed the fraction of
changes equal to -3. The results, reported in Table A10 in the Web Appendix (together with the
analogous numbers for positive changes), show that the lower bound at -10 is never binding for
changes in any of the five bins other than the bottom bin.
In Table 7 we address the plausible concern that current commodity prices are affected by
expectations of future political developments in the main world producers. We therefore ex-
clude from the sample all countries belonging to OPEC (columns 1 and 2) and those accounting
for more than 3% of total world production of their principal commodity (columns 3 and 4).29
Despite the significant drop in sample size, in our key specifications the results on the hetero-
geneous impact among autocracies remain robust at least at the 10% significance level.
Our source of identification for resource windfalls stems from variations in the international
price of the principal commodity. Other authors in this field (Deaton, 1999; Brückner and Ci-
ccone, 2010; Besley and Persson, 2011) use instead a country-specific composite price index,
weighting commodity prices by each commodity’s share in the country’s total exports. We
have not followed this strategy because of concerns with the possible endogeneity of com-
modity shares (as well as measurement error). However in Table 8 we check the robustness
of our results to this alternative specification, constructing a country-specific index based on
commodities in our sample. In columns 1 and 2 we weigh price changes by each country’s
time average of the share of that commodity in exports. Because time coverage of the share
data varies dramatically over time, these averages are also computed over very different time
periods from country to country. In the other columns we follow the far superior practice of
using shares in a given year. The downside of this is that sample sizes shrink significantly as in
each year there is a sizeable subset of countries for which shares are not observed. In these ex-
29We treat Indonesia and Gabon as OPEC countries, as they belonged to the organization for more than half of
the sample period. Instead, we exclude Angola and Ecuador, who joined the OPEC only in 2007. Alternative
treatments of these countries do not alter the results. A list of the major producers by principal commodity, as
well as data sources for commodity production, is given in Table A2 in the Web Appendix.
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periments, the qualitative patterns of our baseline results are robust, but statistical significance
is not always achieved.
In Table 9 we deal with the issue of commodity typology. An important distinction that has
been made in the literature is between point source and diffuse natural commodities (Sokoloff
and Engerman, 2000; Isham et al., 2005). The former are believed to foster weaker institutional
capacity and induce greater resistance to democratic reforms than the latter, as they are gener-
ally more valuable and easier to control for the ruling elite. We therefore expect our theory to
apply more strictly to countries whose principal commodity is point source. We take as point
source all mineral commodities plus coffee, cocoa, sugar and bananas [agricultural commodi-
ties identified as point source in Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) and Isham et al. (2005)]. Our
data show that point source producers are indeed more autocratic (average Polity2 level -0.36)
than countries with diffuse principal commodities (average Polity2 level 3.57). A mean com-
parison test rejects the null hypothesis of means equality at the 99% confidence level (t-stat
17.56). Columns 1 and 2 in Table 9 confirm our baseline results for the sample of point source
producers: the impact of resource windfalls is negative and heterogeneous within autocracies,
while it has no effect in democracies. Columns 3 and 4 show instead an average significant
effect for diffuse commodity producers, but no significant heterogeneity. In columns 5 to 8
we consider an alternative classification, taking as point source commodities minerals only.
Columns 5 and 6 confirm the results for mineral autocratic countries. Column 7 and 8 consider
non mineral countries only and displays a negative average relation between price and institu-
tional change, with no evidence of heterogeneity in the effect. In the last set of columns we
tried to check whether the difference in results between point-source/mineral and diffuse/non-
mineral is driven by oil. Unfortunately, the “oil” sample becomes too small for significant
results, but the similarity of coefficients suggests that oil is not the only mineral driving the
heterogeneous effect of resource booms in autocracies. Altogether, Table 9 provides support
for our theory in point source producers under both alternative classifications, while it is less
conclusive for diffuse commodities producers.30
A final robustness check we performed was on the sensitivity of our results to possible out-
30In a related finding Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) report that the probability of leadership change decreases
following windfalls in the form of oil and lootable diamonds, while it increases following mineral windfalls.
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liers. We re-run our specifications excluding all the observations in the top 1% of the distri-
bution of price changes (in absolute value) and/or in the top 1% of the distribution of Polity2
changes. We also excluded all influential observations, as identified by the DFBETA method,
once again without changes in results. These results are available on request.
4 Conclusions
We have presented a model of endogenous political-regime determination as a function of
natural-resource rents. The model predicts that, everything else equal, resource poor countries
will be more likely to be democracies than resource rich ones. This is a notoriously difficult
prediction to test. Hence, we use the model to develop an additional testable implication that,
we argue, better leads itself to causal identification. This prediction is that, among autocracies,
resource windfalls will trigger further moves towards harsher forms of autocracy, the more so
the less entrenched the autocracy was initially, while there is no impact in countries that start
out as democracies. These predictions find empirical support in a broad panel of countries.
Future work could usefully look at other outcomes. We have briefly discussed in the text the
possibility of extending the model to deliver predictions on uses of the resource rents other than
to distort the political rules of the game in the incumbent’s favour, such as spending on educa-
tion or infrastructure. This could be extended to generate predictions on the growth response
of the economy to resource windfalls. It seems likely that such extensions will produce similar
nonmonotonicities in the relation between resource windfalls and outcomes as we found in this
paper, and that such predictions could be tested using a similar conditioning strategy.
The nonmonotonicities we uncover, both theoretically and empirically, imply a more nu-
anced policy response to natural-resource windfalls than has generally been the case heretofore.
While our empirical work focuses on “local” changes in resource rents, the model predicts that
a large discrete resource windfall has the capacity to tip a democracy into autocracy. Coun-
tries close to the democracy-autocracy threshold are therefore more vulnerable to the impact of
large resource discoveries, and should be the focus of heightened attention from policy makers
in importing countries and extractive industries alike.
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Figure 1. Theoretical Relation between Resource Revenues and Autocracy
Figure 3. Estimated Coefficient at Different Bins
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Figure 2. Marginal Price Effect at Different Initial Levels of Polity
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Table 1. Countries by Commodity
Princ. Comm. Countries Countries
Oil 30 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, China, Norway, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon
Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lybia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trinindad, Tunisia, UAE, UK, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen
Coffee 11 Brazil Burundi, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Madagascar
Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda
Wood 9 Austria, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Sweden
Pig Iron 8 Albania, Bhutan, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Japan, Lebanon, Slovakia, Ukraine
Gemstones 7 Armenia, Botswana, Central African Republic, India, Lesotho, Namibia, Sierra Leone
Oranges 6 Cyprus, Israel, Italy, Moldova, Spain, Turkey
Aluminum 6 Bahrain, Germany, Ghana, Mozambique, Slovenia, Switzerland
Cotton 5 Benin, Burkina Faso, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Sudan
Bananas 4 Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Philippines
Beef 4 Djibouti, Ireland, New Zealand, Uruguay
Copper 4 Chile, Mongolia, Peru, Zambia
Fish 4 Bangladesh, South Korea, Malta, Tanzania
Phosphates 4 Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, Togo
Coal 3 Australia, Czech Republic, Poland
Tobacco 3 Greece, Malawi, Zimbabwe
Bauxite 2 Guinea, Jamaica
Natural gas 2 Belgium, Turkmenistan
Rice 2 Pakistan, Thailand
Swine 2 Denmark, Netherlands
Tea 2 Kenya, Sri Lanka
Wheat 2 Argentina, France
Cocoa 1 Cote d’Ivoire
Gold 1 Papua New Guinea
Groundnuts 1 Gambia
Jute 1 Nepal
Maize 1 United States
Rubber 1 Cambodia
Silver 1 South Africa
Soybean 1 Paraguay
Sugar 1 Eritrea
Tin 1 Bolivia
Uranium 1 Niger
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
∆Polity2 0.096 1.724 -18 16 5380
Polity2 0.983 7.538 -10 10 5572
Polity2 1962 -0.118 7.641 -10 10 93
Polity2 2009 4.145 6.09 -10 10 131
∆Pr 0.078 0.185 -0.366 1.044 5491
Share 0.058 0.097 0 1 4048
Country Avg. Share 0.068 0.093 0.001 0.41 6288
Years Princ. Comm. 22.124 11.851 2 48 6288
Total Years 30.901 15.054 2 48 6288
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Table 3. Commodity Price Shocks and Institutional Change. Baseline Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LS LS LS SYS-GMM
∆Pr pr -0.25
(0.17)
∆Pra -0.33* -0.42** -0.43*
(0.18) (0.19) (0.26)
∆Prd 0.12 0.13 0.09
(0.19) (0.18) (0.24)
∆Pra ∗Plt−4,a -0.14** -0.19***
(0.06) (0.07)
∆Prd ∗Plt−4,d 0.04 -0.07
(0.06) (0.08)
Plt−4,a -0.06*** -0.04
(0.02) (0.04)
Plt−4,d -0.12*** -0.11
(0.03) (0.07)
Demt−4 -1.04*** -1.35*** -0.93***
(0.11) (0.14) (0.31)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000]
AR(2) [0.684]
N. of countries 131 131 131 131
Observations 4875 4745 4745 4745
∗ Significantly different from zero at the 90% level, ∗∗ 95% level, ∗∗∗ 99% level. The de-
pendent variable is the t− 1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ∆Pr is the
average 3-years change in the price of the principal commodity. ∆Pra is the average 3-years
change in the price of the principal commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1
if the country is autocratic at t-4. Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t− 4, minus the
average score among autocracies at t− 4. ∆Prd and Plt−4,d are the corresponding defini-
tions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic
at t-4. The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares, in column (4) system-
GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parenthesis are Huber robust and clustered at
the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and
second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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Table 4. Components of Polity2
∆Exconst ∆Exrec ∆Polcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
∆Pra -0.10 -0.10 -0.18** -0.17* -0.09 -0.09
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13)
∆Prd 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.03
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12)
∆Pra ∗Plt−4,a -0.04** -0.05** -0.06** -0.07** -0.07** -0.09**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
∆Prd ∗Plt−4,d 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Plt−4,a -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04*** -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Plt−4,d -0.05*** -0.04** -0.02* -0.01 -0.06*** -0.05**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Demt−4 -0.42*** -0.35*** -0.42*** -0.25** -0.56*** -0.37***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.776] [0.629] [0.695]
N. of countries 131 131 131 131 131 131
Observations 4745 4745 4745 4745 4745 4745
∗ Significantly different from zero at the 90% level, ∗∗ 95% level, ∗∗∗ 99% level. The
dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is the t−1 to t change in the Polity IV subscore of
constraints on the executive (Exconst), whose range is [1, 7]. In columns (3)-(4) is the t−1
to t change in the Polity IV subscore of contraints on the executive recruitment (Exrec),
whose range is [1, 8]. In columns (5)-(6) is the t−1 to t change in the Polity IV subscore of
political competition (Polcomp), whose range is [1, 10]. ∆Pra is the average 3-years change
in the price of the principal commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
country is autocratic at t-4. Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t−4, minus the average
score among autocracies at t − 4. ∆Prd and Plt−4,d are the corresponding definitions for
democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic at t-4.
The method of estimation in columns (1), (3), (5) is least squares, in columns (2), (4),
(6) system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parenthesis are Huber robust and
clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values
for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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Table 5. Account for Export Share
Ex. 1st Decile Ex. 1st Quartile Ex. Below Median Control for Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
∆Pra -0.41** -0.46 -0.41* -0.51* -0.58** -0.80** -0.38* -0.64*
(0.20) (0.28) (0.21) (0.30) (0.26) (0.38) (0.21) (0.34)
∆Prd 0.31* 0.29 0.34* 0.31 0.42 0.31 0.23 0.10
(0.18) (0.25) (0.20) (0.29) (0.31) (0.35) (0.19) (0.24)
∆Pra ∗Plt−4,a -0.13** -0.18** -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.13** -0.17** -0.17** -0.25**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
∆Prd ∗Plt−4,d 0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.25* 0.03 -0.05
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07)
Plt−4,a -0.08*** -0.05 -0.07*** -0.05 -0.07** -0.07 -0.05* 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
Plt−4,d -0.13*** -0.13* -0.13*** -0.13* -0.07 -0.10 -0.12*** -0.16**
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Share -0.06 -1.62*
(0.43) (0.98)
Demt−4 -1.39*** -0.99*** -1.39*** -0.87*** -1.31*** -0.92*** -1.32*** -0.89**
(0.15) (0.31) (0.16) (0.32) (0.18) (0.31) (0.19) (0.38)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.119] [0.071] [0.553] [0.628]
N. of countries 117 117 98 98 65 65 131 131
Observations 4217 4217 3593 3593 2399 2399 3599 3599
∗ Significantly different from zero at the 90% level, ∗∗ 95% level, ∗∗∗ 99% level. The dependent variable is
the t− 1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ∆Pra is the average 3-years change in the price
of the principal commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t-4.
Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t − 4, minus the average score among autocracies at t − 4. ∆Prd
and Plt−4,d are the corresponding definitions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the country is democratic at t-4. Columns (1)-(2) exclude countries in the first decile of average share for
the principal commodity. Columns (3)-(4) exclude countries in the first quartile of average share for the
principal commodity. Columns (5)-(6) exclude countries below the median of average share for the principal
commodity. Columns (7)-(8) control for the export share level. The method of estimation in columns (1),
(3), (5), (7) is least squares, in columns (2), (4), (6), (8) system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in
parenthesis are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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Table 6. Boundedness of Polity2 Score
∆Pl ≥ 0 D=1 | ∆Pl ≥ 0 Unbounded Countries Unbounded Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
∆Pra -0.45** -0.72** -0.05 -0.06 -0.39* -0.48 -0.41* -0.44
(0.17) (0.35) (0.03) (0.04) (0.23) (0.32) (0.21) (0.30)
∆Prd -0.01 -0.27 -0.01 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.05
(0.12) (0.21) (0.03) (0.03) (0.29) (0.36) (0.26) (0.32)
∆Pra ∗Plt−4,a -0.16*** -0.13 -0.03** -0.04** -0.13 -0.20** -0.14* -0.18**
(0.05) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
∆Prd ∗Plt−4,d 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.07
(0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12)
Plt−4,a -0.01 0.06 -0.00 0.00 -0.08*** -0.04 -0.08*** -0.03
(0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Plt−4,d -0.07*** -0.09** -0.01*** -0.01 -0.15*** -0.12 -0.13*** -0.09
(0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Demt−4 -0.85*** -0.41 -0.13*** -0.07** -1.25*** -0.84*** -1.26*** -0.74**
(0.12) (0.25) (0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.29) (0.13) (0.33)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.010] [0.001] [0.238] [0.814]
N. of countries 131 131 131 131 90 90 107 107
Observations 4593 4593 4745 4745 3223 3223 3635 3635
∗ Significantly different from zero at the 90% level, ∗∗ 95% level, ∗∗∗ 99% level. The dependent variable is
the t− 1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ∆Pra is the average 3-years change in the price
of the principal commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t-4.
Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t − 4, minus the average score among autocracies at t − 4. ∆Prd
and Plt−4,d are the corresponding definitions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
country is democratic at t-4. Columns (1)-(2) consider non-negative Polity2 changes only. Columns (3)-(4)
estimate a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a positive Polity2 change, and 0 otherwise. Columns (5)-(6)
restrict the sample to countries that never touched the boundaries at -10 and +10 on the Polity scale. Columns
(7)-(8) exclude the observations at -10 and +10. The method of estimation in columns (1), (3), (5), (7) is
least squares, in columns (2), (4), (6), (8) system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parenthesis are
Huber robust and clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values
for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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Table 7. Excluding Big Producers
Exclude OPEC countries Exclude Big Producers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
∆Pra -0.43** -0.36 -0.54** -0.54
(0.21) (0.28) (0.24) (0.33)
∆Prd 0.10 0.02 -0.03 -0.24
(0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.36)
∆Pra ∗Plt−4,a -0.15** -0.21** -0.15* -0.23**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
∆Prd ∗Plt−4,d 0.04 -0.00 0.07 0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Plt−4,a -0.07** -0.03 -0.08*** -0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Plt−4,d -0.12*** -0.12* -0.13*** -0.11
(0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10)
Demt−4 -1.31*** -1.00*** -1.42*** -1.27***
(0.13) (0.32) (0.18) (0.43)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.750] [0.770]
N. of countries 120 120 87 87
Observations 4283 4283 3004 3004
∗ Significantly different from zero at the 90% level, ∗∗ 95% level, ∗∗∗ 99% level. The dependent
variable is the t − 1 to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ∆Pra is the average 3-
years change in the price of the principal commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to
1 if the country is autocratic at t-4. Plt−4,a is the country’s Polity2 score at t − 4, minus the
average score among autocracies at t− 4. ∆Prd and Plt−4,d are the corresponding definitions for
democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic at t-4. Columns
(1)-(2) exclude OPEC countries. Columns (3)-(4) exclude countries producing more than 3% of
total world production in their principal commodity. Detail on the sources used to identify big
producers are reported in Appendix Table A2. The method of estimation in columns (1), (3) is
least squares, in columns (2), (4), system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parenthesis
are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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Table 8. Alternative Commodity Price Index
Average Weight Weight 1975 Weight 1980 Weight 1990 Weight 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM LS SYS-GMM
∆Pra -0.39 -0.36 -0.49* -0.34 -0.46 -0.36 -0.52* -0.28 -0.52* -0.60*
(0.25) (0.36) (0.28) (0.40) (0.28) (0.32) (0.30) (0.33) (0.28) (0.35)
∆Prd 0.20 0.40 0.31 1.03* 0.29 0.47 0.09 0.22 0.29 0.73
(0.33) (0.42) (0.38) (0.55) (0.22) (0.33) (0.37) (0.46) (0.34) (0.54)
∆Pra ∗Plt−4,a -0.10 -0.15 -0.12 -0.19* -0.16* -0.25** -0.22** -0.20** -0.11 -0.18*
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
∆Prd ∗Plt−4,d 0.07 -0.13 0.12 -0.20 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 -0.06 0.08 -0.16
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.20) (0.09) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (0.08) (0.14)
Plt−4,a -0.07*** -0.04 -0.07** -0.07 -0.06** -0.04 -0.03 -0.00 -0.07*** -0.06
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Plt−4,d -0.10*** -0.11* -0.10*** -0.13* -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10*** -0.12*
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06)
Demt−4 -1.32*** -1.02*** -1.43*** -1.11*** -1.29*** -1.04*** -1.20*** -0.83*** -1.32*** -1.07***
(0.13) (0.27) (0.17) (0.29) (0.14) (0.25) (0.15) (0.30) (0.13) (0.26)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.467] [0.758] [0.016] [0.425] [0.088]
N. of countries 131 131 84 84 82 82 78 78 122 122
Observations 4962 4962 3600 3600 3527 3527 3327 3327 4629 4629
∗ Significantly different from zero at the 90% level, ∗∗ 95% level, ∗∗∗ 99% level. The dependent variable is the t−1
to t change in the revised Polity score (Polity2). ∆Pra is the average 3-years change in the price of the principal
commodity, multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is autocratic at t-4. Plt−4,a is the country’s
Polity2 score at t−4, minus the average score among autocracies at t−4. ∆Prd and Plt−4,d are the corresponding
definitions for democracies. Demt−4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic at t-4. All columns
follow the methodology in Deaton and Miller (1995) to construct the weighted price index of commodities. We
use all commodities included in the UN COMTRADE database and whose price series is identified in the IMF
IFS database. Columns (1)-(2) weigh commodities by their average share in country exports, measured over all
available years. Columns (3)-(4) weigh commodities by their share in 1975, the base year used in Deaton-Miller
(1995). Columns (5)-(6) weigh commodities by their share in 1980, the base year used in Besley-Persson (2008).
Columns (7)-(8) weigh commodities by their share in 1990, the base year used in Deaton (1999) and Brückner and
Ciccone (2010). Columns (9)-(10) weigh commodities by their share in 2001, the year with the highest number of
reporting countries. The method of estimation in columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) is least squares, in columns (2), (4),
(6), (8), (10) system-GMM (Blundell-Bond). Standard errors in parenthesis are Huber robust and clustered at the
country level. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated
disturbances in the first differences equations.
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